Statutory Interpretation
The law is ever evolving and new legislation is passed through the legislative process regularly. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has recently reviewed the laws surrounding Statutory Interpretation as it relates to federal human rights laws in Duverger v. 2553-4330 Québec Inc. (Aéropro).
Long ago the Courts adopted statutory interpretation rules to determine the manner in which the legislative bodies intended the legislation to be read, understood, applied and implemented. For example, human rights legislation have fundamental protections meaning that Courts must adopt a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve their objectives. See Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd.; Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission); Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board). For example, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in their decision rendered in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), at page 339:
“In approaching the interpretation of a human rights statute, certain special principles must be respected. Human rights legislation is amongst the most pre-eminent category of legislation. It has been described as having a "special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary..." (Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., … at p. 547). One of the reasons such legislation has been so described is that it is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised. As the last protection of the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions to such legislation should be narrowly construed (Brossard (Town) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne), … at p. 307; see also Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., … at pp. 567 and 589).”
Since this decision, however, Court have continued to bring clarity to the issue. For example, in British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 (CanLII) where the Courts looked at the ordinary meaning attributed to the language in the Code. The Court determined in University of British Columbia v. Berg, ... at p. 371 that while human rights law should be provided broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its intended aims, the “interpretive approach does not give a board or court license to ignore the words of the Act in order to prevent discrimination wherever it is found.” For example, the SCC stated:
“In Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., supra, McIntyre J. observed (at p. 547) that "[l]egislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary -- and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect." This Court has repeatedly stressed that a broad, liberal and purposive approach is appropriate to human rights legislation, and that such legislation, according to La Forest J. in Robichaud, at p. 89, "must be so interpreted as to advance the broad policy considerations underlying it". These comments serve to underline the importance of the mandate of s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, which directs that "[e]very enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.” However, “This interpretive approach does not give a board or court license to ignore the words of the Act in order to prevent discrimination wherever it is found. While this may be a laudable goal, the legislature has stated, through the limiting words in s. 3, that some relationships will not be subject to scrutiny under human rights legislation. It is the duty of boards and courts to give s. 3 a liberal and purposive construction, without reading the limiting words out of the Act or otherwise circumventing the intention of the legislature.”
Further, the quasi-constitutional guarantees have been clearly stated by the Federal Court with respect to the Canadian Human Rights Act more recently. See: Canada (Attorney General) v. Johnstone and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General).
However, the case law dictates that - as things stand - Courts should not adopt a narrow or technical construction of the legislation such that it would frustrate the intent and purpose for which it was created.
Further, the Court have looked at legislation with discrepancies between the English and French versions. For example in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), where the Supreme Court of Canada held:
“A principle of bilingual statutory interpretation holds that where one version is ambiguous and the other is clear and unequivocal, the common meaning of the two versions would a priori be preferred; see: Côté, supra, at p. 327; and Tupper v. The Queen, 1967 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1967] S.C.R. 589. Furthermore, where one of the two versions is broader than the other, the common meaning would favour the more restricted or limited meaning: see Côté, supra, at p. 327; R. v. Dubois, 1935 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1935] S.C.R. 378; Maurice Pollack Ltée v. Comité paritaire du commerce de détail à Québec, 1946 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1946] S.C.R. 343; Pfizer Co. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, 1975 CanLII 194 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456, at pp. 464-65; and Gravel v. City of St-Léonard, 1977 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 660, at p. 669.”